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Abstract 
 
Marriage, migration and related phenomena such as marital stability, fertility and 
investment in human capital may be better explained by studying marriage and migration 
jointly. We thus proceed in this paper to explore the role of migration in obtaining joint 
labour-market and marriage-market equilibrium. This facilitates identification of several 
novel and testable hypotheses. 
 
Résumé  Mariage et migration 
 
C’est en étudiant conjointement le mariage et la migration que l’on peut expliquer le 
mieux ces deux phénomènes et d’autres qui leur sont liés, tels la stabilité matrimoniale, la 
fécondité et l’investissement en capital humain. L’auteur adopte cette démarche pour 
étudier le rôle de la migration dans la détermination d’un équilibre simultané du marché 
du travail et du marché matrimonial. Ceci facilite la formulation de plusieurs hypothèses 
originales qui peuvent être testées. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Migration may be conceptualized as an action that agents take to find a match in 
any market where geographical proximity impinges upon the productivity of the match. 
Two markets in which many agents participate are the labour market and the marriage 
market. These two markets interact in an important way because migration that facilitates 
a match in the labour market will also influence the prospects available and the outcome 
obtained in the marriage market and vice versa. In some ways the issue is similar to the 
choice of which consumer good to buy when each good contains a particular fixed 
combination of attributes. The consumer must consider the cost of the good in relation to 
his valuation of each of the attributes contained in the package. Likewise, individuals 
who contemplate migration need to compare the cost of moving with the value of the 
potential outcome in both of the relevant markets. The joint nature of the equilibrium may 
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be particularly striking for young adults who are completing their schooling and leaving 
their parents’ homes. Labour migration at this age is high as individuals make their initial 
job or career choices. Usually, at the same stage in their life cycles they are also making 
decisions about first marriages [see Grundy and Fox (1985)]. A second important 
connection exists between marriage, labour-market opportunities, and migration because 
individuals often live as part of a family unit. Thus a family migration will affect the 
potential matches in the labour market and the marriage market for all family members, 
particularly when the family remains intact. A migration decision that maximizes family 
utility will often conflict with an individual member’s maximizing decision. If the 
individual is not compensated, this situation can lead to the breakup of the family. 
 
Despite these apparent linkages, most research on migration has focused on the 
individual’s decision and how that decision relates to labour-market opportunities [see, 
however, Mincer (1978) and Stark (1978) for exceptions]. A few researchers have begun 
to examine the distribution of gains and losses due to migration for married men and 
women [see Sandell (1977) and Maxwell and Shapiro (1983)], but they, too, have ignored 
the more complicated interactions. Similarly, research on marriage and divorce tends to 
ignore migration as a causal factor or as a consequence, e.g. of divorce, although the 
correlation between state migration rates and state divorce rates in the United States has 
been noted. 
 
It is our view, however, that marriage, migration and related phenomena such as 
marital stability, fertility and investment in human capital may be better explained by 
studying marriage and migration jointly. We thus proceed in this paper to explore the role 
of migration in obtaining joint labour-market and marriage-market equilibrium. This 
facilitates identification of several novel and testable hypotheses. 
 
 
2. Sex-specific labour-market and marriage-market incentives 
 
Assume that the nature of the demand for labour and the supply response which 
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involves migration are sex-selective. For example, large expansion in urban construction 
activity draws a disproportionately large number of males from the village sector. 
Motivated by wage differentials, such migration may bring about an array of reactions in 
the marriage market of the sending village. Assuming an underlying desire to marry, the 
response may be split between a price effect - a lower supply price of brides, and a 
quantity effect - fewer women ending up in marriage or more women spending, on 
average, a shorter spell of time in marriage (as the remaining males now marry more 
frequently and more than once). But since the local shortage is not a global shortage, the 
response need not be split in this manner; village women wishing to marry may now 
migrate to the urban sector characterized by a sex ratio which, from their point of view, is 
more favourable to marriage. The reason for migration is an expectation that the rate of 
meeting “marriageable” men will be higher. [This holds true even on the basis of a 
random drawing (pairing).] Obviously, meeting a trading partner need not result in a trade 
but, especially if marriage markets are culturally and ethnically, yet not spatially 
segmented, both the arrival rate of “marriageable” partners and the success probability 
associated with meeting a partner will be higher; the fraction of the population having the 
minimal necessary set of traits is larger. 
 
Note that especially if they succeed as migrants, the men who migrated earlier 
will be able to afford to marry while in the urban sector as this would mitigate the urban 
sector income and price constraints, which are probably less conducive to family 
formation than the income and price constraints operating in the rural area.1 
 
It is thus possible to differentiate between two types of migration: a labour-market 
migration and a lagged marriage-market migration. Note that when it comes to the 
construction of the regression equations, the dependent variable in the former enters as 
the independent variable in the latter. And if migration is regressed only on wage, such 
that a cross-market spillover from cause to conduct is overlooked, then in the structural 
                                                 
1 A related point is that since the urbanization process is positively and strongly associated with market 
employment opportunities, which are less contingent upon intra-familial complementarities and exchange 
than is employment in rural areas, the average duration of marriages and/or the propensity to marry will be 
adversely affected. 
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equation there will be an upward bias in wage as an explanation of labour migration. 
Furthermore, note that even if in an adjacent but culturally and ethnically distinct market, 
for example, migration with a reverse sex selectivity takes place, a high likelihood of a 
second-round marriage migration prompted by an earlier labour migration and following 
its same route can be expected if the (“institutional”) segmentation of marital markets is 
sharp.2 
 
Assume, as it is typically the case, that if they marry, women marry men who are 
older than they are by a number of years and that in a given sending-community marriage 
is universal. Now, a marriage-migration response to labour migration is unlikely to be sex 
symmetrical. If the initial labour migration is by single females, the remaining males may 
locally marry younger women. But if the initial labour migration is by single males, the 
remaining women cannot locally marry older males (this follows from the universal 
marriage assumption) or younger males (this follows from the assumption of a male-
female positive age differential in marriage). Thus, a simple testable prediction is that the 
elasticity of the response of marriage migration to male-selective labour migration will be 
larger than the elasticity of the response of marriage migration to female-selective labour 
migration. If (all) migration is regressed on a wage differential, the upward bias in the 
structural equation will be larger in the case of male-selective labour migration.3 
 
Furthermore, consider a situation in which rural-to-urban migration is age and 
sex-selective largely because of the nature of the differential rural and urban market 
                                                 
2 In extreme circumstances, when societal considerations place a high value upon marriage, society may 
take recourse to drastic measures to induce migration in order to facilitate the desired marriages. In the 
story of the concubine in Gibeah (Judges 19-21), the killing of all the children of Benjamin except 600 men 
was associated with an oath by the men of Israel not to give their daughters “unto Benjamin to wife”. 
Subsequently, in order to rectify this, a combined institutional and market strategy was adopted: a surplus 
of 400 wives was artificially and brutally created in Jabesh-gilead by slaying all males there, whereas the 
remaining 200 wives were to be “caught” by the children of Benjamin in Shiloh and “imported” to the land 
of Benjamin. This story provides a sharp illustration of the cost (the shadow price) associated with 
“institutional” segmentation of marital markets - a refusal to marry into another ethnic group. Presumably, 
such marriages could have taken place since it is highly likely that as a consequence of frequent wars of the 
time, a “surplus” of females would have existed in some neighbouring nation. 
3 It is also possible that the male-selective labour migration will result in a change in the male-female age 
differential at marriage. One reason why women marry older men in Less Developed Countries (LDCs) is 
that it is necessary for men to have saved up enough wealth to support a family or to pay the bridewealth. If 
male-selective labour migration leads to a lower female (bride) supply price in the marriage market at the 
sending end, women may be willing to marry younger men who have saved a smaller amount of wealth. 
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demands for labour. A marriage-market consideration might better explain the residual 
migration pattern, i.e., that pertaining to the other sex. For example, in mid-nineteenth 
century England, there was little market demand for female labour in the countryside 
after the demise of cottage industry. By one account [Williamson (1985)], there is some 
evidence suggesting that while rural male children switched from being net marginal 
economic burdens to net marginal economic benefits between ages 10 and 13, females 
did not; while urban females switched from burden to benefit between ages 9 and 11, this 
switch did not occur in the countryside. And, indeed, it appears that for the teen ages, 
female migration was much greater than male migration. Because the male children did 
switch from burden to benefit while staying in the countryside, as pointed out, it is 
possible their parents had an additional marriage-market based incentive to constrain the 
migration of their sons. If females desiring to marry return to the countryside from the 
male-deficient towns, parents of male children can expect to reap an additional gain 
associated with the accumulated wealth of their sons’ brides. Indeed, this reasoning 
receives some support from evidence of there being hardly any remittances to parents 
from migrant children during the early-to-middle nineteenth century (partly due to the 
absence of efficient capital markets) and of there being a sharp drop in female rural-to-
urban net migration rates in their late teens and of actual return migration of females of 
marital age. In short, parents of male children could have enjoyed some of the benefits 
accruing to female migrant children by discouraging their sons from migrating, drawing 
upon a marriage-market mechanism as a means of partaking in a migration-induced 
wealth increase of young females. 
 
Parents may strategically choose the level of investment in their children’s human 
capital in order to affect their migration behaviour while in marriage. To proceed we shall 
make several assumptions that appear to replicate fairly well the stylized facts pertaining 
at least to today’s US economy and society. Suppose that daughters tend to support their 
parents more than sons do (for example, daughters carry more extensive responsibilities 
for aged parents) and that the level of a child’s support is positively related to both the 
child’s economic well-being and to his/her proximity. Suppose, furthermore, that the 
likelihood of a child, once in marriage, migrating in response to given expected joint 
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earnings (i.e., of both spouses) elsewhere is a declining function of the difference 
between these earnings and the couple’s actual income, and that earnings are positively 
related to human-capital endowments. Suppose finally that in human-capital terms, by 
and large girls “marry up” whereas boys “marry down”, such that, for simplicity of 
exposition, marriages are matches wherein a husband possesses one more unit of human 
capital than does the wife. Given these assumptions, parents will tend to make larger 
human capital investments in their daughters than in their sons. The reasoning is 
straightforward. If parents invest n  units of human capital in their son he will end up 
marrying a woman with 1n −  units of human capital whereas investing n  in their 
daughter will entail her marrying a man whose human capital is 1n + . Clearly, in terms of 
the value of the marriage-market match, the returns to investment in human capital in the 
latter case are greater [returns per unit are ( )1 /n n+ ] than in the former [returns per unit 
are ( )1 /n n− ]. The higher match returns are valued more by the parents because of our 
assumption that they derive greater support from a daughter than from a son (entailing 
them having an incentive to see to it that a daughter is well married (in income-earning 
terms) that is stronger than the corresponding incentive pertaining to a son). But the 
higher parental returns also accrue because of the dampening effect of the married 
couple’s higher earnings on its possible migration in response to given expected earnings 
elsewhere. Whereas the married daughter’s household will command 2 1n +  units of 
human capital, the married son’s household will command only 2 1n −  units. Thus, the 
given higher expected earnings elsewhere will be less likely to entail migration by the 
daughter’s household than by the son’s. And indeed, that - in terms of human-capital 
investments - parents in the US favour girls has been noted, though only loosely 
explained, by Behrman, Pollak and Taubman (1986).  
 
 
3. Marital stability and intra-marital distributional responses to sex-selective labour-
market migration 
 
An additional effect has to be recognized; it has to do with the impact migration 
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has upon existing marriages and the labour-market decisions of those who are married 
and living in the receiving community. In the United States, for example, aggregate data 
indicate that migration rates are higher for never-married men than for never-married 
women [United States Bureau of the Census (1970, table 7)]. This difference will lead to 
an increase in the male-female sex ratio in areas that experience net in-migration, and a 
decrease in the male-female sex ratio in areas that experience net out-migration. Consider 
then an economy where output is produced by males and females who are paid a wage 
equal to their marginal product. Male migration to the economy takes place, raising the 
male-female sex ratio and along with it the wage rate for females.4 If the distribution of 
the value of marriage in favour of a spouse positively depends upon his or her relative 
bargaining power and if, in turn, this power is positively affected by the spouse’s market 
position [Stark (1984)], the terms of the marital agreement will probably be renegotiated. 
Such a renegotiation process may result in women who stay married reducing the costs of 
marriage-specific activities that are disproportionately borne by them, e.g., fertility and 
child-rearing or, alternatively, in the breakup of marriages. If, as suggested below, the 
positive substitution effect associated with the relevant variable (women’s wage) is 
stronger than the negative income effect, women’s participation in the labour force will 
increase, which may partly mitigate the initial increase in their relative wage. Such 
increased participation could, in itself, also lead to erosion of existing marriages and their 
dissolution. Thus, a simple migration-marriage prediction emanating from this reasoning 
is that when the conditions underlying it hold, male-selective migration into a community 
is positively correlated with the rate of marital dissolution in the receiving community. 
                                                 
4 A simple proof might be instructive. We wish to show that male migration will entail an increase in the 
wage rate of females - and a decline of the wage rate of (all) males (including the married non-migrants). 
We assume that output is produced by a twice-differentiable production function ( ),F MG L L . We also 
assume a competitive (profit-maximizing) wage determination. Hence, ( )1 1,F M
F
G L L
G W
L
∂= =∂  and 
( )
2 2
,
,F M
M
G L L
G W
L
∂= =∂  where 1 2,W W  are the wage rates of females and males respectively. By totally 
differentiating these equations, we obtain 1 11 12 2 21 22,F M F MdW G dL G dL dW G dL G dL= + = + . With male-
selective migration ( FL  is constant), the first term in each of these equations vanishes, hence 
1 12 2 22,M MdW G dL dW G dL= = . From the standard assumptions of production theory - production inputs 
being supportive and declining marginal products, viz., 12 0G >  and 22 0G <  respectively - we obtain 
1 0dW >  and 2 0dW < . 
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What is striking about this case is that the destabilizing consequences in the 
marriage market arise from actions taken by agents who do not participate in it. A 
spillover from the labour market, due to the interlinking of markets, is the cause. The 
incoming male migrants need to substitute for native males in the labour force, but not for 
native males as bridegrooms (as, for example, might have been the case with respect to 
Englishmen in Quebec). 
 
4. The effect of marital status on the returns to migration as an investment, and 
marriage-related responses to this effect 
 
Migration is neither an occupation nor a profession. But human-capital 
investments can be made in or toward it. The treatment of migration as an investment 
rather than as a transaction cost invites interesting associations with marriage. The level 
and composition of other investments and the choices pertaining to them may be highly 
conditioned by migration, especially if the cross rate of return to the joint decision of 
making a given investment and pursual of migration is substantially higher than the 
return to each alone. Furthermore, since migration constitutes a response and adjustment 
to changes in labour markets, it may assume a particularly important role when these 
changes are large (structural). If being married constitutes a constraint upon migration, 
then a shift in structural parameters pertaining to labour markets will be negatively 
correlated with marital rates and the average duration of marriage and positively 
correlated with marital age and rates of marital dissolution. If being married is considered 
to be conducive to migration, the signs of the correlations will be reversed. For example, 
when market institutions in general and capital and insurance institutions in particular are 
not too well developed (especially as in the case in LDCs), a spouse may assume an 
important role in conferring financial support and insurance benefits and, therefore being 
married will facilitate rather than hinder migration.5 It is thus tempting to speculate that 
the major structural changes taking place in the industrialized countries in the 1970s have 
                                                 
5 Note that in LDCs, an important rationale for having children is that they serve as assets. The demand for 
children as assets may depend upon the extent to which they raise the mean family income per person, and 
reduce the uncertainty of family income per person. When children confer these benefits as migrants [see 
Katz and Stark (1985)], marriage and migration are subject to an additional link; marriage constitutes an 
input in the production of children who, upon reaching adulthood, act as migrants. 
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significantly increased the importance of migration as an adjustment device to changing 
labour-market opportunities, placing tension on marriages and leading to higher rates of 
dissolution. The statistical evidence pertaining to the first and third elements in this 
causation is fairly clear [see Mincer (1985)], but the association with migration has yet to 
be tested. 
 
Clearly, marriage may constrain migration in ways that are quite subtle. The 
typical account of the increased participation in the labour force of married women in the 
advanced economies over the last three decades or so attributes a major role to the rise in 
the forgone value of time spent in marital activities. This rise, postulated to be attributable 
to an increase in the demand for female labour, leads to substitution away from “marriage 
production”. Clearly, for the growth in the earning power of women to be realized, 
women have to participate actively (and to lengthen their participation) in the labour 
force, which presupposes that they invest in market-oriented, earning-raising human 
capital (marketable skills). Not only does migration constitute an element in such 
participation and investment, it may also be an integral part of many jobs when the full 
realization of the benefits associated with them presumes migration-linked job mobility, 
job promotion and travel. Mutual reinforcement may play a role here; if migration results 
in a steeper wage profile, the incentive for future participation in the labour force is 
greater; which tends, in turn, to enhance even further the already-mentioned dominance 
of the substitution effect over the income effect. If migration pays off well, it becomes 
even more desirable and is pursued at the expense of competing activities. 
 
A structural change may also be demographically induced. Assume, for example, 
an unusually large cohort reaching adulthood (“baby boomers”). Suppose, again, that 
women always marry men who are older and hence, that there is a relative scarcity of 
bridegrooms. Assuming that marriage markets are competitive then, as scarcity generates 
value, women who wish to “marry well” (positive assortative mating) will have to 
increase their market value. This, in turn, may require larger investments in skill 
acquisition, training and possession of superior earning power and jobs. To a small or 
large extent, these requirements may mandate migration as a response mechanism to 
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differential labour-market opportunities. This argument holds, of course, in addition to an 
enhanced need to engage in migration that may arise if marital opportunities as such 
(mere presence of potential partners) differ sufficiently across marriage markets to 
warrant migration. 
 
In general, higher labour-market pay may be contingent upon there being greater 
continuity of work and fewer interruptions in work. In turn, such greater market 
orientation might mandate a swift response to changing opportunities requiring migration 
between labour markets. The tension between family commitments and migration 
response associated with market commitments is partly resolved by erosion of the former, 
which assumes the form of shorter marriages, postponement of marriage, increased 
dissolution of marriage and the production of smaller families. Put somewhat differently, 
a resolution may be conferred by changes in the inputs going into a marriage and the 
output-mix generated by it. Substitution of investment in market-oriented human capital 
for investment in marriage-specific human capital illustrates an input response, whereas a 
smaller family size / reduced fertility illustrates an output adjustment. The timing of 
fertility may also be adjusted. To demonstrate this point assume, for example, that the 
timing of the first birth depends upon maximization of life-time earnings. From the point 
of view of married women, such calculations will have to account for costs and returns 
associated with acquisition and depreciation of human capital due to temporary 
withdrawals from the labour force associated with raising children. In those instances 
(e.g., medicine, academic careers) where the quality of the initial labour-market match is 
important in shaping the profile of life-time utility, where career opportunities are 
available to women, and where migration is important in effecting a high quality match 
between skills and jobs, it makes sense to keep the costs associated with migration low, 
hence to postpone childbearing. In such situations, migration will tend to be associated 
with a first birth interval of a long duration. However, if the supply of jobs open to 
women is such that the life-earning profile hardly depends upon the quality of the initial 
match so that migration makes little difference, the association between migration and the 
first birth interval may not be signed one way or the other. 
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This argument could be generalized: marriage and migration may be looked at as 
means to or stages in a plan aimed at maximizing life-time utility. The level of this utility 
is sensitive not only to the timing of each one singly but also to their ordering. This is 
because of the existence of cross effects and is particularly so when such effects are 
powerful. Individuals will thus choose a given sequence strategically; a woman in the 
Philippines will migrate when single to an urban area because her migration is conducive 
to occupational mobility and to securing a higher social status. By thus increasing the 
(expected) value associated with a subsequent entry into the marriage market, she ends up 
with higher expected life-time utility than would be the case had she chosen the reverse 
sequence [cf. Lauby (1987)]. The effective rate of return to the appropriately-timed 
migration (that is, the rate calculated while capturing the full effect that accrues from 
complementarities) is thus greater than the direct rate of return. Similar considerations 
might account for the tendency of rural women in preindustrial Northwest Europe to 
migrate into service in other households. “Savings accumulated during service were 
probably often a substantial contribution to the economic basis of a woman servant’s 
subsequent marriage” [Hajnal (1982, p. 495)]. 
 
Concerning the input response, marital formation has an obvious spatial 
dimension in that the contracting parties engage in production and consumption of 
services that, for the most part, must be consumed when and where produced; hence, 
almost by definition, marriage entails cohabitation and the sharing of a household. 
Likewise, separation and divorce require physical relocation. In an environment 
characterized by a 50 per cent probability of marital dissolution, if in half the cases the 
husband leaves the household, the probability of a dissolution-associated move for a 
person entering marriage is one quarter - surely too high to be ignored in investment 
planning. Often such moves are strongly associated with “real migration” either to reduce 
the psychic costs associated with the dissolution (“to start a new life”) or the pecuniary 
costs, e.g., to avoid child-support payments. It may thus be somewhat difficult to 
disentangle the migration-effect (or incentive) from the dissolution-effect upon market-
oriented human-capital investments of married persons in an environment characterized 
by high rates of separation and divorce and migration, but the estimated coefficient of the 
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effect of separation and divorce in such an investment function may overstate the true 
coefficient. 
 
Finally, an interesting relationship between earnings, divorce and migration may 
derive from the realistic assumption, combined with other assumptions, that wage rates 
for men are higher than for women. Consider a situation whereby location decisions are 
made jointly by the married couple so as to maximize total wage income. If the inter-
market variation in male wages is larger than the inter-market variation in female wages, 
and if female wages are not strongly positively correlated with those for males, then when 
it comes to a locational choice, the husband’s wage will weigh more heavily than the 
wife’s. (In the maximand, a premium will be attached to the husband’s wage.) In the case 
of divorce, the husband (whose labour-market location while in marriage better matches 
the location when single) would be less likely to have a wage-based inducement to 
migrate than the wife who, under these assumptions, may have sacrificed her own wage 
prospects while in marriage. All other things being equal, under these circumstances the 
prediction would then be that in the case of divorce, higher migration rates by women 
than by men will be observed. To some extent this prediction is confirmed by evidence 
presented in Sander (1985); in the United States (1970) farm and rural-nonfarm divorced 
women migrated more frequently than farm and rural-nonfarm divorced men.  
 
In addition, note that migration followed by divorce may reveal an otherwise 
unobserved distribution of marital wealth between husband and wife. Consider, for 
example, the case where the wife is a tied migrant, i.e., she joins her husband - who 
anticipates to gain from migration - despite her anticipated loss. Consequently, she may 
require some compensation in return for her sacrifice. It is quite difficult to observe such 
reallocation for married couples, but it might be possible to observe it for couples who 
become divorced. Peters (1983) shows that the amount of the divorce settlement for 
women in the United States is positively related to the actual marital investments made 
by them. Therefore, a woman who is a tied mover and who becomes divorced after a 
move would be better off at the point of divorce than a similar woman who did not move 
before divorce. 
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5. Conclusions 
 
When broadly interpreted, marriage and migration share a number of common 
features. Both involve search and its resolution (pairing of mates in the case of the 
former, matching of labour and firms in the case of the latter). In both cases success in 
finding “a partner” is sensitive to the availability of partners and to the distribution of 
their endowments and traits. Almost always, and along with separation and divorce, 
marriage mandates spatial relocation which may translate into migration. Both marriage 
and migration may be seen as a means to an end, e.g., establishing a family, obtaining a 
well paying job. Both involve a movement that is associated with adjustment costs from 
one state (e.g., singleness, unemployment) into another (marriage, employment). The 
decisions to enter marriage and undertake employment or the decisions to divorce and 
quit a job depend on exogenous parameters, some of which are determined by the 
marriage market and the labour market. And, indeed, since both marriage and divorce 
take place in the context of broadly defined markets, they may and often are analyzed 
applying market concepts, theorems and solutions. Both affect labour supply. Each also 
commands, and is subject to, a respectable and growing economic and demographic 
literature. Yet, somewhat surprisingly, we could not pinpoint one single systematic 
attempt that checks through the interactions between marriage and migration; no study 
we know of provides explicit delineation of the causal relationships between marriage 
and migration. We have attempted in this paper to begin to rectify this state of research. 
 
Essentially, we have developed our presentation along three modes of 
classification: (i) We discussed individual decision-making pending possible migration 
prior to or following marriage. Individual migration may be undertaken due to labour-
market considerations, marriage-market considerations or both. An individual may 
migrate to improve his or her employment prospects and will postpone marriage if being 
married hinders such migration. The formation and dissolution of marriage has also been 
analyzed in the context of changes in the marriage market resulting from population 
changes brought about by migration, leading, for example, to a change in the sex ratio. 
(ii) In comparison to a single person, a married couple my find it easier or harder to 
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migrate, depending on the nature of the labour market and whether both spouses work or 
not. It might be easier for both to find work while in marriage as marriage provides self-
insurance by sharing the individual risks of unemployment. Alternatively, a married 
couple may move because of a better job for one spouse only, yet the move is made 
somewhat more difficult when the other spouse’s job cannot be replaced by an equivalent 
job. (iii) Marriage dissolution could cause migration when marriage is the only reason 
that has kept a spouse from moving. It may cause migration due to the added effect of 
psychological reasons - “to start a new life”. There are links between our three modes of 
classification related to the notion of intertemporal planning. An individual who plans to 
migrate may well postpone or set forward his or her marriage if a married couple 
migrates less or more easily. And if one spouse considers the probability of divorce to be 
high, he or she will be more reluctant to move along with his or her partner to a new 
location if he or she bears significant individual moving costs. In the preceding sections 
we have elaborated on these and related issues and suggested several empirical 
implications. Among social scientists there appears to be a fairly strong tendency to 
confine scholarly work to well, yet narrowly defined domains – to labour markets (by 
economists), to marriage processes (by demographers and sociologists). However, as the 
above discussion demonstrates, an integrated research agenda can delineate interesting 
new implications. We hope that our ideas will stimulate additional formulation and 
testing of these implications. 
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